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Do Better-Informed Workers Make Better 
Retirement Choices? A Test Based on the Social 
Security Statement
Economic models of retirement implicitly assume that 
workers know their future benefi ts as a function of their 
retirement age and are able to compare future streams of 
benefi ts. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that these 
are strong assumptions. When asked, only around 50 percent 
provide an estimate of their expected Social Security benefi ts 
(Bernheim and Levin 1989; Gustman and Steinmeier 2001).1 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) show that less than 30 per-
cent of respondents are able to estimate their future benefi ts 
to within about $1,500 per year. Moreover, Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2006) show that fi nancial illiteracy is widespread 
among older Americans. Only half of the age 50+ respon-
dents can correctly answer two simple questions regarding 
interest compounding and infl ation. Is it then reasonable 
to assume that those same respondents are able to compute 
their retirement incentives, which typically involve relatively 
complex calculations? 
Despite very little knowledge about retirement incen-
tives, the fact that people seem to respond to incentives when 
making their retirement decisions has been called by Chan 
and Stevens (2003) an “important empirical puzzle in the 
retirement literature.” 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) try to test the robustness 
of retirement models when a measure of knowledge about 
benefi ts is added to the retirement regression. They fi nd that 
knowledge does not affect workers’ responsiveness to incen-
tives. Chan and Stevens (2003) go one step further and ana-
lyze how the interaction of knowledge and accruals affects 
workers’ decisions. The authors fi nd that the responsiveness 
to pension incentives is entirely driven by the 20 percent 
of workers who perceive them correctly.2 The validity of 
using measures of knowledge in the regressions, however, is 
questionable as knowledge is endogenous: workers gather in-
formation when they approach their expected retirement age. 
We make use of a unique natural experiment to shed light 
on these issues: In 1995, the Social Security Administration 
started sending out the annual Social Security Statement. 
The statement is a concise, easy-to-read personal record of 
past earnings and a summary of the estimated benefi ts for 
the worker and his or her family as a function of his or her 
retirement age. The statement has been sent out in phases, 
starting with workers who were 60 years and older. In later 
years it has been sent according to the following (year, age) 
combinations: (1996, 58+), (1997, 53+), (1998, 47+), (1999, 
44+), (2000, 25+). 
The introduction of the statement provides an exogenous 
source of variation in the information about Social Security 
benefi ts. This change is used to analyze workers’ retirement 
and claiming decisions. First, we model how workers gather 
information about their Social Security benefi ts. The empiri-
cal evidence is consistent with a model of retirement where 
information is costly. The statement allows us to look at 
the effect of moving from a system in which information is 
freely available (but the worker has to show some initiative 
and either call the Social Security Administration or learn 
the Social Security benefi t rules to know about the Social 
Security incentives he or she faces) to a system where the 
cost of gathering information is basically zero. We show that 
these two systems produce signifi cantly different levels of 
knowledge.3 We identify workers who know little or nothing 
about their future Social Security benefi ts before they receive 
the statement and fi nd that they benefi t the most from the in-
formation contained within. We fi nd that, for these workers, 
the effect of the statement on knowledge is strong even when 
they are close to their retirement date.
Respondents from the Health and Retirement survey are 
less likely to say that they don’t know their benefi ts, and 
their expected benefi ts are closer to the actual benefi ts that 
they end up getting in later waves. Uninformed workers, 
though, are a very selective sample of the population. In 
order to value the information, workers need to be able to use 
the information and need to be free to choose their retirement 
age. It is known that workers who face health problems or 
are liquidity constraints tend to retire as soon as possible. 
Consistent with this, we fi nd that wealthier and healthier 
workers are signifi cantly more likely to get informed. A more 
puzzling fi nding is that even after controlling for labor mar-
ket experience, occupation, wealth, and health, black work-
ers and workers with low levels of education are signifi cantly 
less likely to know their benefi ts. One possible explanation 
for this persistent gap is that these workers are also more 
likely to be fi nancially illiterate (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006). 
Later, we measure how the additional information about 
Social Security incentives affects retirement and claiming 
behavior. We look at changes in workers’ expectations about 
their claiming age, and we fi nd only limited evidence that 
receiving the fi rst statement generally induces some workers 
to update their expectations. 
Then we use the exogenous variation in information to 
test whether retirement and claiming decisions become more 
sensitive to Social Security incentives. Workers who are not 
well informed before receiving the statement, namely blacks 
and low-educated workers, are also the ones for whom Social 
Security accruals play the smallest role in claiming deci-
sions. But this is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory, 
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because those workers are also more likely to be liquidity 
constraints and in bad health.
The introduction of the statement, instead, generates 
mixed results. Low-educated workers show a small and 
insignifi cant increase in the responsiveness to the Social 
Security incentives, but black workers show a large and 
signifi cant reduction. This fi nding and two other fi ndings are 
puzzling, namely that 1) workers whose spouses are eligible 
to receive dependent benefi ts become more likely to take 
these additional benefi ts into consideration when deciding 
about retirement (this may be due to the lack of information 
about the existence of spouse’s and survivor’s benefi ts, an 
additional piece of information contained in the statement); 
and 2) workers aged 62 and 65—the two ages at which the 
retirement benefi ts are reported in the statement—become 
less sensitive to Social Security incentives. This is puzzling 
and suggests that some people retiring at 62 and 65 make 
this decision based on simple rules of thumb and not Social 
Security incentives). 
Summing up, it seems that for some groups, namely low-
educated workers, the lack of knowledge is the product of a 
maximization process, while for others, mostly blacks, lack 
of knowledge is more diffi cult to be justifi ed. 
Chapter 2
Labor Supply Effects of the Recent Social 
Security Benefi t Cuts: Empirical Estimates 
Using Cohort Discontinuities 
In 1983, the U.S. Congress implemented an increase in 
the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) of two months per year. 
Each two-month increase in the NRA translates into a little 
more than a 1-percentage-point reduction in Social Security 
benefi ts. This reform is likely to infl uence two important de-
cisions that workers face at the end of their careers: 1) when 
to start collecting Social Security benefi ts, and 2) when to 
retire. Since benefi ts are adjusted actuarially with respect to 
the entitlement age, the long-term solvency of the Social Se-
curity trust fund depends more on retirement decisions than 
on claiming decisions. An increase in labor force participa-
tion generates more contributions, which are the trust fund’s 
main source of revenue.
 This paper studies the effects of an increase in the NRA 
on recent retirement behavior, providing the fi rst ex-post 
evaluation of the reform.4 The evaluation yields both sub-
stantive evidence to inform future reforms and a guide to 
the calibration of structural models of retirement decisions. 
The results also raise serious questions about how best to 
improve the models on which earlier research was based. 
Using the change in the NRA to estimate the effect of Social 
Security incentives on labor supply provides additional ben-
efi ts: the exact change in benefi ts is known, it is not prone to 
measurement error, and it is exogenous. 
Due to the timing of the reform, workers born before 1938 
are the control group and workers born on or after 1938, 
those who experience a reduction in benefi ts, are the treat-
ment group. The analysis uses monthly Current Population 
Survey (CPS) data from January 1989 to January 2006.
Figure 1 shows the changes in average retirement age 
with respect to the 1937 cohort. Because of censoring, I 
focus on workers younger than 66, which leaves three treated 
cohorts: 1938, 1939, and 1940. The dotted lines show piece-
wise-linear fi ts. In all plots there is a clear break in the trend 
toward later retirement between the 1937 and the 1938 birth 
year, and the break is even more evident when a restricted 
sample is used to correct for measurement error in the year 
of birth variable.5
The most obvious cause of this change is the increase in 
the NRA. Point estimates imply an increase in the actual age 
of retirement of about 50 percent of the increase in the NRA 
for both men and women. These results do not change when 
Figure 1   Change in the Average Retirement Age (in 
months) with Respect to the 1937 Birth Cohort 
(Solid Line) and Its Piecewise Linear Fit (dots) 
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controlling for changes in socioeconomic characteristics. 
Previous studies, using out-of-sample predictions, have 
estimated much smaller effects on labor force participation. 
Four major factors may have biased previous estimates, argu-
ably toward zero. First, projections do not capture possible 
changes linked to norms that are related to the NRA. Evi-
dence suggests that some workers look at the NRA as a focal 
point. Mastrobuoni (2006) shows that the distribution of the 
age at which treated workers claim their Social Security ben-
efi ts no longer spikes at age 65, but rather at the NRA. 
Second, given that benefi ts are a function of past earnings, 
estimates based on these models may suffer from endogene-
ity bias. The third source of bias is that these models, since 
they are estimated using cross-sectional variation in Social 
Security benefi ts and retirement status, may capture long-
term effects, while the 1983 benefi t cuts may have been un-
expected. Using a simple intertemporal model of retirement, 
I show that this can generate larger changes in the average 
retirement age than would otherwise be expected.6 
The fourth problem is that in order to construct Social Se-
curity wealth, a component of all forward-looking incentives 
to retire, the researcher needs detailed information about past 
and future earnings, family structure (because of the depen-
dent spouse and child benefi ts and the survivors benefi ts), 
interest rates, and preferences; in short, measurement error 
may be an issue. The increase in the NRA generates a reduc-
tion in Social Security wealth that is exogenous and free of 
measurement error. 
Despite the 1983 reform, the trust fund is projected to 
become insolvent in less than 40 years. While this date of 
insolvency is often portrayed by the news media as certain, 
it is only an estimate. One of the most important sources of 
uncertainty is the behavior of future workers and retirees
 (Anderson, Lee, and Tuljapurkar 2003). The NRA is 
scheduled to reach age 66 for the 1943 birth cohort, stay at 
that level for 12 years, and later resume the increase until it 
reaches age 67. To make better predictions, it is important to 
understand how these changes affect retirement behavior. 
Chapter 3
The Social Security Earnings Test Removal: 
Money Saved or Money Spent by the 
Trust Fund? 
Benefi ciaries of Social Security face restrictions on how 
much they can earn without incurring the earnings test. 
Before 2000, the benefi ts above the annual exempt amount 
were subject to a 50 percent tax for those below age 65 and 
were subject to a 33 percent tax for those between age 65 and 
70. On April 7, 2000, President Clinton signed the “Senior 
Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000,” which eliminated 
the 33 percent earnings test.7 Although benefi ts that are taxed 
away are actuarially adjusted and later returned to the benefi -
ciary as soon as she either reaches age 70 or her earnings fall 
below the earnings test, empirical evidence seems to suggest 
that workers perceive the tax to be permanent (Gruber and 
Orszag 2003). 
The earnings test removal (ETR) was seen as an opportu-
nity to increase the number of retired people going back to 
work. Since the trust fund is projected to become insolvent 
in about 40 years, policymakers’ main concern was that 
the ETR might worsen the long-term fi nances of the fund. 
Fifteen years ago, Honig and Reimers (1989) estimated the 
cost of a complete removal to be close to $2 billion or a 2.3 
percent increase in the present discounted value of the stream 
of benefi ts, the so-called Social Security Wealth. A few years 
later, Gustman and Steinmeier (1991) estimated the budget-
ary cost of an ETR for benefi ciaries above age 65 consider-
ing different behavioral assumptions. The largest estimated 
cost is equal to $92 billion when workers and retirees time 
their applications to maximize the Social Security Wealth. 
The cost drops to $43 billion if liquidity constraints force 
workers to claim benefi ts as soon as they retire, and to −$12 
billion, in which case the administration actually saves 
money, if workers claim at age 65, meaning as soon as they 
are not subject to the earnings test. 
Following the 2000 ETR, several papers have analyzed 
its effect on labor supply, but despite the diffi cult fi nancial 
situation of the trust fund, its effect on the SSA’s fi nances is 
still unknown. Using intermediate assumptions in terms of 
both real interest rates and mortality rates, I fi nd that for the 
1935 cohort the trust fund increased its spending by about $4 
billion as a result of the ETR. However, because of increas-
ing life expectancy, higher actuarial adjustments for late 
claiming, and increasing NRA, these effects are decreasing 
over time, and for workers born in 1943, the additional cost 
is probably close to zero. At the same time, the ETR is be-
lieved to have signifi cantly increased earnings and therefore 
contributions between the NRA and age 69. Using estimates 
from Loughran and Haider (2005), I fi nd that each cohort 
contributes an additional $0.20 billion as a result of the ETR. 
Nevertheless, the trust fund appears to have increased its 
liabilities toward the fi rst workers who were subject to the 
ETR. But for workers born after 1941 the trust fund actu-
ally seems to have saved money. If workers maximize their 
family utility functions, by a revealed preference argument, 
the ETR has been for workers born after 1941 Pareto-im-
proving. There are two reasons that suggest that removal of 
the remaining part of the earnings test (between age 62 and 
the NRA) is unlikely to produce larger costs. First, if we 
believe that after age 62 disutility from work is increasing 
with age, labor supply between age 62 and the NRA is going 
to respond even more strongly to an ETR. Second, mortality 
between age 62 and the NRA is low, especially because the 
additional removal would affect much younger cohorts, and 
the actuarial adjustments are high. Thus, most workers are 
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better off claiming around the NRA. For these workers, ear-
lier claiming is likely to produce lower long-term spending 
for the trust fund. These results suggest benefi ts for repealing 
the remaining portion of the earnings test. 
Notes
1. In our data that focus on workers aged 55 and above, two-thirds 
of workers are able to provide an estimate. 
2. Chan and Stevens (2003) do not fi nd any link between knowl-
edge and Social Security incentives, which they consider a result 
of data limitations. The fi rst limitation is that they can measure 
if workers correctly perceive their Social Security benefi ts, but 
not if they correctly perceive their Social Security accruals. The 
second limitation is that the match between the Health and Re-
tirement Survey and the administrative records is available only 
up to the 1992 survey year, and is likely to introduce measure-
ment error in the benefi t calculations for the subsequent years. 
3. Dufl o and Saez (2003) is similar in spirit to our analysis in that 
it also deals with the endogeneity problem of information. The 
authors use a randomized experiment to study the role of infor-
mation in the employees’ decisions to enroll in a Tax Deferred 
Account retirement plan. They conclude that “the important 
decision about how much to save for retirement can be affected 
by small shocks such as a very small fi nancial reward and/or the 
infl uence of peers, and thus does not seem to be the consequence 
of an elaborate decision process.” 
4. Coile and Gruber (2007), Fields and Mitchell (1984), Gustman 
and Steinmeier (1985), and Panis et al. (2002) use prereform 
data to simulate the effect of an increase in the NRA on labor 
supply. 
5. As fi rst noted by Quinn (1999), the early retirement trend has 
reversed and is now decreasing. 
6. Benefi t increases instead may generate smaller reductions in 
labor supply when workers learn about them too late (Burtless 
1986). 
8. The legislation, effective retroactively to January 1, 2000, still 
requires that the test’s higher exempt amount be applied to 
benefi ciaries’ earnings in the year they attain their normal retire-
ment age. 
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